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Abstract _ 
In a two period general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets, it 
is shown that the contraction of nominal financial markets that occurs during 
high inflations can result from the variability of the future rate of inflation 
and from large bankruptcy costs. If the probability that inflation in the future 
will be high is sufficiently large, then, for a generic set of endowments, an 
increase in the variability of future prices reduces the utility possibilities set. 
In economies with only nominal assets more variable future prices lead to a 
Pareto fall in social welfare. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the welfare costs of inflation; it investigates how 
does monetary instability affect the way in which a society can allocate risk. 
Our research is 1110tivated b~' the observation that in economies with high in­
flation nominal financial markets become very thin (Heyman and Leijonhufvud 
[19]). V\Te examine the reasons underlying this phenomenon and analyze its wel­
fare consequences. We find that the ("ontraction of nominal financial markets 
observed during high inflations can be explained b~' the variability of the future 
rate of inflation and by large bankruptcy costs·. An important aspect of the 
contraction of nominal financial markets is that when future price levels are 
very variable, nominal securities cannot be used to transfer income into or out 
of high inflation states. As a result, in high inflation economies in which there is 
a small (but positive) probability that prices will be stabilized. increases in the 
variability of the future rate of inflation render nominal securities useless. and 
reduce the efficiency with which financial markets can allocate risk-i.e. they 
reduce the utility pO;;~I"ilities set. 
In the economy we analyze asset markets are incomplete and money is used as 
a unit of account in nominal financial contracts. In such an economy. monetary 
authorities face a problem of security design2 that arises because the value of 
money determl11es the real payoff of nominal securit ies. By choosing the price 
Jevelmonetary authorities determine the set of feasible reallocations of income 
across st ates of nature for any given array of real and nominal t't>curit ies. We 
study how the economy adjusts to increases in the level of future prices in some 
hlgh inflation statfs while prices <He held fixed in lOll' IIIflatlon statt8. That 
is, we analyze the consequences of increases in till' l'arwbtlity of the future 
rate of inflation. We find that monetary policies characterized by (i) a large 
ratio between inflation in the high and the low inflation states and (ii) a large 
probability of high inflation are dominated polices. 
The contraction of nominal financial markets induced by the variabilit~· of 
the future rate of inflailon stems from restrictions on nominal portfolios imposed 
by a no-bankruptcy condition. In tl\l' low inflation states (for which the real 
I Sudden and drastic changes in t he rate of inflation, usuall~' associated with attempt s to 
stabilize the price level. are a corrunon feature of high inflation economic,. This is illu,trateo 
in the following table that shows summary statistics for the inflation prOless in Argentina. 
Argentina: Feb 19ii·:'-iov 1989 
Pt pr - P,-l 
t\ledian 8.i'7c 0.2% 
Std. Dev. 1i.,s'7c 11.6'7c 
~Iin 2.0'7c -8S.1'7c 
~Iax 1iO.5% 68.9% 
Pr: monthly rate of inflation. 
21n this paper we do nol attempt to find an optimal monetary policy. We limit ow-selves 
to the characterization of a class of dominated monetary policies. 
payoff of nominal assets is high) the no bankruptcy constraint imposes bounds 
on the short positions that agents can take in nominal securities. In equilibrium. 
this also restricts long positions. As a result of these bounds on portfolios. in 
the high inflation states nominal portfolios will have very small payoffs. Thus. 
nominal assets become useless to transfer income to and from the high inflation 
states when future prices are extremely variable3 . 
When the probability of a high inflation state is sufficiently large. the vari­
ability of the future price level has several additional effects. First, it reduces 
the value of trade in nominal assets at date O. For, as the price level in the high 
inflation states increase and the probability of a high inflation state rises. the 
price of nominal securities falls while the size of nominal portfolios is restricted 
by the no bankruptcy constraints. Second. extremely variable rates of inflation 
reduce the set of feasible utility levels of a t)'pical economy. A highly variable 
inflation prevents the use of nominal assets to redistribute income between high 
inflation states. curtailing the gains that can be attained in those states from 
trading nominal securit ies. Thus. when it is very likely that a high inflat ion 
state will occur extremely variable inflations reduce the efficiency of financial 
markets. If all the assets that are traded in financial markets are nomina!. then 
an increase in the variability of t he rate of inflation leads to a Pareto decline in 
social welfare. Of course. this will not occur in economies with Part~to optimal 
endowments in which there are no gains from trade. 
Our main theorem shows that if the probability of high inflation is st:fficiently 
high. then. for a generic set of endowments. an increase in the variability of t!w 
future rate of inflation reduces tlH' utility possibilities set. However. this does 
not imply that high inflat ions make everyone worse-off. When t here are real. 
as well as nominal assets in t he economy. the shift in monetary policy may 
redistribute income in such a .....ay that some agents benefit from the highly 
variable monetary policy. An example at the end of the paper shows that 
when these redistributive effects arise. they stem from chanbes in the price,.; of 
real securities. Another example highligh ts t he role played by the probabilit y 
distribution over the future rate of inflation. If the probability that inflation 
will be low is sufficiently high. a variable rate of inflation is not necessarily 
harmful from a social point of view. In fact. we provide an example ..... here all 
increase in the variability of the rate of inflation leads to a Pareto improvement 
in social welfare. Even when the rate of inflation is very variable. nominal assets 
are still useful to realloc ate income between low inflat ion stat es. Hence. if the 
probability of 10..... inflat ion states is sufficiently high it is possible for increases 
ill the variability of the rate of inflation to be socially beneficial. 
This article contributes to the discussion of the welfare effects of inflation 4 . 
Other st udies of the .....elfare costs of inflat ion examine. among other things. (i) 
the "shoe leather" costs associated with low levels of real money balances (Bai­
3Notice that nominal assels can stiU be lIsed 10 transfer income in the low inflation states. 
4 For a general discussion of the welfare costs of inflation see Driffill et. at. [lOJ and 
Modigliani and Fischer [13J. 
ley. [3]). (ii) the "Tobin effect" of inflation on capital accumulation (Tobin. [2i]). 
(iii) the distortionary effects of the inflation tax (PheJps, [25] and Drazen, [9]. 
(iv) the inefficiencies in the allocation of resources that arise as a result of imper­
fect information and the confusion of relative and aggregate prices (Lucas, [20]. 
[21] and Cuckierman, [6]), (v) the menu costs of price adjustment (Sheshinski 
and \Veiss, [26]), (vi) the inefficiencies introduced by variable relative prices in 
search models (Tommasi, [28]) and (vii) t.he inefficiencies introduced in financial 
intermediation by high inflation (Azariadis and Smith [2]). Our model adds to 
this large literature by focusing on the impact. of monetary instability on the 
efficiency with which financial markets allocate risk. While most of the litera­
ture on the welfare effects of inflat ion focuses on the role of money as an asset. 
a medium of exchange and a unit of account in commodity markets. we address 
the issues arising from the role that money has as a unit of account in nominal 
financial cont racts. In the economy we st udy, t he only channel through which 
monetary policy can affect the economy is through the redistributive effects that 
it has when nominal securities art> traded and asset markets are incomplete. If 
nominal securit ies are not tradt>d or asset markt>ts are complete. the allocat ion 
of resources is independent of the actions of monet.ary authorities. 
The article also cont.ributes to the literat ure on general equilibrium wit h 
incomplete financial markets (GEl). When asset markets are incomplete and 
some securities have payoffs specified in terms of units of money. the value of 
the unit of account matters because it It>ads to changes in the subspace of income 
transft>rs across st.ates of nature achievable through trade in financial markets. 
This is the key insight of a series of papers that study the real effects of changes 
in till' price level in economies with nominal assets and incomplete financial 
market.s. Cass [5] showed that in this I)'pe of economies. for a generic choice 
of endowments. there is a continuullI of equilibria that depend on the value 
of money. The dimensionality of the set of equilibria has been characterized 
by Balasko and ('ass [--1] and Gf'anakoplos and ~Ias-('olell (15]. Magill and 
Quinzii [22] have shown that when outside money is added t.o the model. and 
agents have a motive for holding it. equilibrium consumption allocations will 
be locally unique and will depend on the quantity of outside money. This 
article extends this Iiterat ure by analyzing t he welfare consequences of different 
monetary policies. It also highlights the role of no-bankruptcy constraints in 
models of incomplete markets t hat has heen previously st udied by Dubey et al. 
[11] and Zame [29]. 
The remainder of the paper is organizeJ as follows. Section 2 describes 
Jll':lIletar)' policy. the GEl model and lays down our assumptions. Section 3 
studies the effect of the variability of the rate of inflation on the size of nominal 
financial markets. sect ion 4 discusses t he consequences of high expected inflation 
on economic efficiency and section:) contains several examples. 
(j 
2 The Model. 
The purpose of the model presented bellow is to study how the actions of policy 
makers influence the behavior of an economy via money's role as a unit of 
account in financial contracts. For this reason we present a monetary economy 
in which this is the only role for money. We assume that there are no t.rading 
frictions and therefore money is not necessary for transaction purposes. Money 
is just an abstract unit of account used to denominate financial contracts. The 
value of money-the inverse of the price level-is modeled as an exogenous 
variable that is determined by monetary authorities. 
Consider a two date economy with one perishable commodity and denote the 
states of the world by S =0, 1, ... , Sand t.heir respective probabilities by 1I'(s). 
wit.h state 0 corresponding to date 0 and states 1. .... S corresponding to date 
1. At the beginning of date 0 agents know all the information characterizing the 
economy. but they do not know which of the S st at es of nat ure will be realized 
at date 1. 
I~SERT rIGURE 1 
Definition 1 (Price Policy) A pncf polIcy IS a functlOlI 
p : S + 1I- 'lr~tl 
that assigns to each rwh::atioll of thf staff of thf u'orld. s. a Pr/cc lad. WIthout 
loss of generality, we assume that ptO) =p( 1) =1. 
Agents have perfect conditional foresight and know the price policy chosen 
by the central bank. 
The states of nature at date 1 are indexed by a rule that orders tbem ac­
cording to the rate of inflation: s < s' ~ p(s) < p(s'). We partition 5 the 
states of nat.ure into L low inflation states indexed by s = 1. .... Land S - L 
high inflation sates indexed by s =L + 1. .... S. The probability of a low infla­
tion state is 1I'(L) = L~=ll1'(S) and the probability of a high inflation state is 
1I'(H) = 2:;=L+l 11'(5). 
The variabilit)· of future inflation (prices) is characterized by two numbers: 
{! = r~~1)1) is a lower bound on the ratio between prices in the high and low 
inflation states; if = ~ bounds the ratio of prices between high and low 
inflation states from above. A large value of {! (small value of if) implies a large 
(small) variance of future prices. 
~We could easily incorporate some intemlediate inflation stales into the analysis. If there 
are / states with intennediate inflation then the high inflation slates will be those with L + 
/+1<s<5. 
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Later in the paper we compare the properties of equilibria in which the 
parameters ~ and (f take different values. We adopt the convention that when 
~ or (f vary. the prices in the low inflat ion st ates remain constant and the prices 
in the high inflat ion states change6 . As ~ grows the rate of inflation in the high 
inflation states becomes higher. thus inducing a more variable inflation. (Recall 
that p(O) =1.) We say that a price policy is extremely variable when ~ - 00. 
The expected rate of inflation is 2:s lI"(s)p(s). An economy with a variable and 
high expected inflation is one where lI"(H) and ~are large. 
The asset structure of I.he economy is exogenously given and consists of a set 
of J financial contracts. This set contains a subset I n = {I, ... , I n } of nominal 
contracts and a subset Jr = Un + 1. .... I n + Jr } of real ones. Jr + I n = J. 
Real contracts are promises to deliver units of the single good in the economy, 
while nominal contracts are promises to deliver units of account (dollars). The 
payoff matrices of the nominal and the real contracts are denoted by .f\' and R. 
respectively. N is of dimension 5 x .]". while R is of dimension 5 x Jr. 
N= ( 
The column vectors of X and R represent the st at e contingent payoff of each 
security and are denoted by II) and "j: while the rows rl'present the payoff of 
all the securities in state s and are denoted by II(S) and ,·(s). 
Since the terms of the nominal contracts. the 11j(S)'8. are expressed in terms 
of units of account the matrices Rand .V are not directly comparable. It is 
necessary to divide the rows 11(S) of S by the price level p(s) in order to obtain 
the real payoff of nominal securities. Let p E )R~+ denote the date 1 vector of 
the prices of the consumpt ion good in terms of money for each state. and define 
A-1(p) as 
1 
MTi 
o 
Real asset payoffs are then given by the matrix 
A(p) =[.\-I(p);\',R]. 
Let A](p) be the matrix formed by the first J rows of A(p). AH (p) be the 
H dimensional diagonal matrix of price levels in the high inflation states, IH be 
6If we fix prices in the high inflation states and let prices in the low inflation states shrink 
then the all the results of the paper are valid, albeit ..... ith a different interpretation. The source 
of monetary variability will now be the possibility of an h)·perdeflation. 
an H dimensional identity matrix and PI be a price policy characterized by a 
finite 11. 
Assumption 1 (i) Rank i\' = I n, Rank R = Jr. 
(H) (~ A"i/(Pd)"1 ft span [( ~ I~) R] 
(Hi) pEP = {p I Rank AJ(p) = J}. 
Assumption I rules out the existence of redundant assets;. Any asset t.hat 
has payoffs that can be expressed as linear combinations of the payoffs of other 
assets is redundant and we will not consider it. Part (ii) of the assumption 
requires at least one nominal asset, say asset 1. to be non-redundant in the high 
inflation states for a policy with a finite 11. It implies t.hat nl has to have some 
non-zero element.s in the high inflation states. As it will become clear in the 
proof of theorem 2. this part of the assumption is necessary to assure tha t when 
p(s) -. QC in all the high inflation states the loss of the nominal assets is costly. 
Part (iii) rest.ricts price policies to prevent a drop of rank of AJ(p). Observt' 
that for any payoff matrices Rand .V the admissible class of price policies. 'P. 
is an open and dense set of full Lebesgue measure in )~~+ - i.e. given an asset 
structure almost any price policy satisfies assumption 1. 
Assumption 2 (Stl"Ougy Incomplete Markets) J :S L. 
This assumption is implicitly implied by assumption l(iii) for if L < J and 
p(J) -. ·x then rank[AJ(p)] < J. The full rank of ...1J(p) is necessary to 
generate enough restrictions on portfolios in the proof of Lemma 1 bellow. 
Asset	 prices are denoted by q E ,~J and portfolios are yh E ~J. At date 
oeach of the J securit ies is traded at a price qj. Each component yJ of yh 
represent.s the holdings of security j by individual h: when yJ is positive (neg­
ative) individual h is long (short) in security j. A portfolio of nominal assets is 
y~ E ~Jn and a portfolio of real assets is y~ E 'J~J,. 
Individuals are denoted by h = 0..... H. An individual is characterized by 
her consumpt ion set. preft'rences and endowments. 
Assumption 3 (i) Thf COI/SUl1lpltOI/ !id IS ~~+l lcdh cOl/sumptlOn bundles 
;rh E ~~+l. 
(H) Every indIVidual has a fin/tf endoU'nlflll l'utor..: h En = ~~~l. 
h(Hi)	 Preferel/cfs are described by the utility functIOn u : ~~+l >-~. uh can 
be writtell as uh = (1. 11')rh • where 11' /s a probability measure, 11' E ~~+. 
7 Adding redundant assets to the economy does not alter equilibrium consumption 
allocations. 
9 
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! 
L,1T(S) = 1. and I· h IS a l'onXeumall-Morgfllsterll utility l1Ide:r. l·h E 
?R~+I and has componellts l'~ : 5J? - I~. Each funetlOn l'~ is assumed to 
be continuous, strictly monotonically increasl1lg and difJerentiably strictly 
8l'h ( h 
concave. Furthermore, Jimrhl.)_O ~ x (s)) = x· and Ife adopt the 
nonnali:atlOII uh (..,;h) =O. 
Individuals maximize their utility in the budget set 8 h (p, q) . 
....h(O) + qyh =0 and 
..,;~ =A(p)yh } 
where .r7 and w? are the 5 dimensional vectors of date 1 consumpt ion and 
endowments. In each state. the numeraire is the consumption good in that 
st at e. 
The definition of the budget set and of the consumption set imply that 
individuals always honor their commitments: they only choose financial and 
consumption plans that are consistent with the resources that they have in each 
state. The assumption on the boundary hehavior of the utility function implies 
that consumers will never adopt a strategy wherl' they cannot consume in some 
state. It captures the costs of bankruptcy. 
The data for an economy E, with pricp policy Pi can be summarized in tllP 
array 
E; = [(l'h .....h):=o.R. .Y.7l'.Pi] 
Asset prices do not allow for arbitrage when there are no truding strategies 
that allow consumers to obtain a positive income in some state without paying 
for it in some other state. The set of asset prices that dol's not allow for arbitragt' 
is denot ed by Q and it is defillt'd as follows: 
Q = {q l,Eyh E 'h\J such that ( .4~;~) )y" > o}, 
where y> 0 means that yts) ~ () for all sand yts) > 0 for at least somp s, If 
q fI. Q individuals will be ahle to attain an infinite amount of wealth in some 
state. 
Definition 2 (Equilibrium) For a git'en price policyp,. the consumption and 
portfolio alloca/lons (x oh . yoh ):=0 are an equilibrium for the economy Ei if. and 
only if, there I~ an assd price I'fetor qO E Q for u'h,ch: 
(i) markets clear 
~ .h( - h) 00 
 Y q .p; . ..,; = 
h 
10 
(ii)	 et'fry h manmi:es uh In the budget set 6 h (p" q") 
For any given price policy the economy is in equilibrium when markets clear 
and individuals carry out their optimal programs. The existence of an equilib­
rium for this economy is shown in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [16]. 
3	 The Effect of Inflation on the Market for 
Nominal Securities. 
In this section we show that, when markets are incomplete. high and variable 
rates of inflation induce thin nominal financial markets. 
Lemma 1 and its corollary show that ext remely variable monetary policies 
prevent the use of nominal securities to transfer income to and from the high 
inflation states. The lemma establishes that the payoffs of nominal portfolios 
in the high inflation states have bounds that are inversely proportional to the 
lower bound on t.he variability of future inflation. a.. Hence, as !Z. - x the 
payoff of nominal portfolios in the high inflation states goes to zero. 
Lemma 1 SUPPOSf that assumptions 1.1 and.] hold. for [rery h 3yh l.l·~ - ....:~ = 
.4(p)yh and Lh yh = O. Thol. there enst filllfe numbers ft. and 8 (that are 
zndependeTlt of!Z.) for u'hleh 
ft.	 nj(s) h 8 8 
- <	 --.11 < - for all h. j E J" and for s =L + 1 ..... S. Q:	 p( s)) Q: 
The transfers of meanie to and from the high lIIflatlon states attainable by trad­
ing nominal assets ha/'e all upper and a lou'er boulld that arc Inrersdy propor­
tIonal to the lou'er bOlllld on the rarwhllttll of the rate of Inflation. 
Proof: 3yh I .r~ - ..... ~ = A(p).vh and Lh yh = 0 => Lh.r~ = Lh ..... ~. For 
..... h finite alld .rh E ')\'t+Jthis implies that .r~ E compart set => rh =.r~ - ..... ~ E 
compact set. Let rj he tl1f' vector fOfJ]lPd by the first.] rows of rh. Then. as 
.4J(p) has full rank by assumption I. rh == .4(p).vh => yh == [.4J(pW J rJ => yh E 
compact set. Assumpt ion 2 (J < L l implies that [AJ (plr 1 is independent of 
!Z. because prices levels are fixed in the low inflation states. Hence. 3ft.' and 8' 
(independent of !Z.) such that ft.' < 77j (s )yJ < 8' for all s. hand j E J n. It follows 
that! <..L..ct..f.±.!J < n)(.)y~ < -..L-lif.±.!.l <! for s = L+ 1 .... 5 and 
z.	 p( L)2, p(, ) pi' ) pi L)2, p(. I Z. '
 
9' - '9'
j E J,,: with ft. = prL) and (} =PiTi' o 
~ If there are I intennediate inflation SI ales. L + J should be replaced b~' L + I + 1. 
11 
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Corollary 1 Extremely t'arzable monetary policies prellent the use of nominal 
securities to transfer income to and from the hIgh inflation states. 
1 n(s) h 
-- - 0 =:> - Y - 0 for s = L + 1. ... , Sa.. p(s) n 
The intuition of this result is very simple. Assume that there are exogenous 
bounds on the short positions that agents can take in nominal assets. Then, 
the fact that ~!/:/ yj - 0 when p (s) - oc· follows trivially because the bor­
rowing constraints will prevent yj from going t.o infinity when the real payoff 
of nominal assets goes to zero. The bulk of the proof of lemma 1 is devoted 
to derive bounds that prevent nominal portfolios from going to infinity when 
the level of prices explodes in the high inflation states (and only in the high 
inflation states). Assumptions 1 and 2 guaranty that these bounds exist and 
are independent of prices in the high inflation states. The bounds on portfolios 
that we derive in the proof of the lemma stem from the restrictions imposed. in 
the low inflation states. by the rf'quirement that agents have to pay their debts 
with their available resources. This can be illustrated with a simple example. 
Observe that the non-negativity of consumption (no bankruptcy) implies that 
_",.h :s T h =.r7 -..:7 =A(p)yh :s Lh .... hand assume 
[AJ(pJr: = [.\Jno(P) 0]IJ, . 
\ ominal portfolios are then rest fl< led by thI' value of the endowmen ts in t he low 
inflation states-i.e. y~ E Iy~ : _p(j)..:h (j):S yj :s P(j)Lh ...·h (j) for j E J,,}. 
It follows that for this simple asset strllct ure~ 
_p(L) [nj(S)p(j) .... h(j)] :s Tl)(s)yj :s p(L) [n.(~)p(j)L.... h (j)] 
p (s ) p( L ) p( s) p (s ) p( L ) h 
(' . 1 J t'l [!!..z..!..::-I (.) h(')] d ii (7 [~(')~ h(')]Jor) = " so ~ = 1'1 L) P ).... ) an = 1'1 L \ P) L-h · ) . 
Theorem 1 and its corollary state that in an economy with strongly incom­
plete asset markets (J < L) where the rate of inflation is extremely variable 
(a.. - oc) and the probabilit y of high inflat ion is large (11'( H) - 1). the value of 
the volume of trade in nominal securities shrinks to zero. 
TheOl'em 1 Suppose assumptIOns 1.2 and .) hold. Thell. in equilibrium. 
{!Z. -:le and 1I'(H) - I} =:> qjyj - 0 
for all h and for all j E I n · 
9Provided n) (s) > o. If n) (s) < 0 the inequalities are reversed. 
12 
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Proof: At a competitive equilibrium q; =Du h :\ -I (p )nj for every h. There­
h _ ~L ,I n j (.ly7 ~H ,I, fl J I.ly7fore, q;Yj - ~.=11I'(S)1 (.r(s)) pi.') + ~.=L+I;r(s)1 (.I(s)) p(..) . The first 
sum vanishes when 11'( H) - 1 for at an equilibrium 1" and yh are bounded. The 
second sum vanishes by Lemma 1.0 
Corollary 2 An extremely l'ariable alld highly expected illflation induces thin 
nominal financial markets. For all j E J" 
k -- 00 and 1I'(H) -- 1} => L qj Iyj I -- 0 
h 
The idea behind the proof is very simple. The price of a nominal assets 
can be decomposed into the present value of its payoff in the low and in the 
high inflation states. The present value of the payoff of the portfolio in the 
low inflation statt?s is small if these statt?s occur with a negligible probability. 
For the high inflation states. we have just proved that the ex-post payoff of a 
nominal portfolio goes to zero as !L grows without bound. 
Efficiency and High Expected Inflation. 
\re have established that, when asset markt?ts are incomplete, a variable inllat ion 
reduces the ability of nominal assets to transfer income to and from high inflat ion 
states (Lemma 1). Thus, sonw potential gains from trad!' are forfeited. TJw 
next two theorems show that when there is a high u'ptcttd illflat 10 1I (when 
stabilization plans are possible but unlikely) this nducts tht tfficiency with 
u'hich financial markets allocalt risk. 
"'e compare the economies El. E2 . Ex and Er. Er is an economy wh('re 
there are only real assets-i.e y~ = 0 for all h. El is an economy with a 
finite (11. E2 and Ex are economit?s with monetary policies characterized hy 
!Ll < !L2 < !Z..-x =?c. 
Theorem 2 refers to an economy with rfal and 1I0millalloiecurities and studil's 
the behavior of the sets of utility vectors (l',) that can be reached by at.tainablf' 
allocations in the economy E;. It compares tht? utility set in the benchmark 
economy Et, where the variability of the future rate of inflation is finite (0' is 
finite). wit h t he one t hat is alt ai ned when t he variability of t he rate of inflat ion 
is higher. If the probability of a high inflation state is sufficiently high then. for 
almost any distribution of endowments, different monetary policies induce the 
following ordering of utility sets: Cr C C'Xl C ['2 C Cl' The last three inclusions 
are a direct consequence of the bounds on nominal portfolios established in 
Lemma 1. The relation l'r C [,'00 stems from the gains from trading nominal 
securities derived from the low inflat ion st ates. 
In order for the theorem to hold it is important to have an economy with het­
erogeneous agents and a high probabilit y of high inflat ion. Extremely variable 
13 
monetary polices reduce social welfare because t hey annihilate the gains from 
trading nominal assets that are attained in the high inflation states. Therefore. 
if these states are not likely to occur. or if there are no potential gains from 
trade that are forfeited, the theorem does not apply. 
Even though as £!..I - oC' and 7r( H) - 1 the utility possibilities set shrinks, it 
is not possible to Pareto rank the equilibria corresponding to different monetary 
policies. Changes in monetary policy can lead to changes in the prices of real 
assets that redistribute income across individuals. Theorem 3 shows that this 
cannot occur when there are no real assets. 
Definition 3 (Attainable Allocation) We say Ihat a71 allocation;x IS atlam­
able in the economy Ei if x E :Fj: 
:T, ; {, E !I1~H+"IS+" , ~ (,' - j I ; 0 , .. d3y' E ~'J I,: - ~~ ; A(P')Y'} 
Definition 4 (Utility Set) The ulilily s(/ l"; C R~+I IS Ihe se! of ulllily 
"ec/ors u = (uo .... , uH ) u·hlch (1111 be rel1ched by allaillable al/ocallOlIs 111 Ihe 
economy Ej : Ihal is. 
['j = {u E ~~+I : for all allillllable .r ill Ej, uh = uh (x h ) for all h} 
We will abuse the notation and write II (,1') for [.... u h(.rh) ....] .
 
A generic set of endowments is an open and dense set of full Lebesgue mea­

. \))(H+I)(S+I) 
sure In -:Tl++ . 
Theorem 2 Suppose 2 :s H. (TI 18 jillllf alld a8sllnJpllOIIS 1.2 alld.3 hold. TIle 1/. 
Ihere txlsls a gOlerlc se! of elldOIL'lnellls. n-. and posilil'( I/umbers fo and fr.2 
such Ihal if...: E n-. 0 < 7r(L) < b al/d fr.1 < !!.2 < fr."" = x: 
I~SERT FIGrRE 2 
Proof: The proof proceeds in several steps. Let.x E iR~+1 and define 
Wj (.x) = max.xll subject to II E C. 
Slep 1: Suppose 2 :s H. (11 is finite and assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then. 
there exists a generic set. n-. such that if...: E n· for any .x > 0 and for any 
7r (L) > O. (i) Wr (.x) < 1\'1 (.x) and (ii) Irr (.x) < Ir"", (.x). where Il'oo (.x) = 
lim£.,_oo max.xu subject to u E Uj • 
Proof: Let i = 1. r:x:. :Fr C :Fi and. hence. F r C Uj. So we have to show 
that under the assumptions of the theorem there is a generic set of endow­
ments for which Uj = arg max.xu subject to II E l.'j implies Iti tI. Cr. Let 
Xi =arg max.xu (;x) subject to x E :Fi . By the separability of each uh the prob­
lem maxr .xu(x) subject to x E :Fi can be transformed into two independent 
14 
problems: (i) ii' =ma.x.r(O) '\110 (.l'(0)) subject to Lh .l.h(O) _".;h (0) =O. and (ii) 
W, = maxy '\UI (...,1 + A(p, )y) subject to Lh yh = 0 and u·h(S)+7'( s)y~ + ;i: iy~ ~ 
0, where each component of UI is the expected utility of agent h at date 1. 
H/, (,\) = IV (>.) + W, (>.). We only need to analyze 'the second problem for 
W is independent of monetary policy. The first order necessary and sufficient 
condi tions for solving this problem are 
Lh .vh =0 (1) 2:3,\h 8~~(h3) (...:h (s) + Q (sUi) Qj (s) = qj for every h.j 
In the appendix We show that if 2 ~ H. Cfl is finite and assumptions 1 and 3 
hold, then there exists a generic set of endowments. n- . such that if ".; E n-: 
the solution of (1) has the property that y~ i- 0 for every h. Assumption 1 then 
implies that for any 1r(L) > 0 ii; (.r (0) .....:1 + RYr +.v (p,) y,J rt. [Or. 0 
Step 2: Ii Ill .. , (L )-0 lim...l.._O Wj (,\) =lim.. ,1 L 1-0 !rr (,\). for any ,\ > O. 
J:., 
Proof: Again, we write Jr, (>') a5 if (,\) + iT, (,\) and concentrate on iT'; (>.). 
. , h h h I1(S) h
subject to ~ y = 0 and It· (s) + r(s)Yr + -(-)Y" ~ 0 p, S 
Corollary 1 implies that if!!; - x an allocation is feasible only if ;i::y,~ - 0 
for S = L + 1. .... H. Hence. 
S 
lilll lim !r, = max L,\h L ",(s)l'h (lI h (S) + "(s)Y;) 
"o(L 1-0 t- o yO.yH h ,:L+ 1 
subje<:t to LY; =0 and It·h(s) + ,'(sl.lJ; ~ o. 
This last expression is lim",IL 1-0 !rr (,\).0 
Step.]; U, can be written &'i C'; = {II E ~h'~+1 ; ,\!/ S !r; (,\) for all ,\ E ~~+1} 
Proof: :Fi is convex for it can be written as the intersection of the complete 
markets feasible set and the linear subspace spanned by the assets. two convex 
sets-:Fj = :FOE n.,.; + (A). Let u. u' E C and 0 ~ a ~ 1. Take attainable 
allocations x and x'. with U = U (x). U' = U (x'). Then x" =ox + (1 - a) x' 
is also attainable. that is. u" = u (x") E C and by the concavity of each uh • 
U" > au + (1 - a) u' ~ O. Hence, au + (1 - a) 11' E C. A vector ii is supported 
by ,\ > 0 if ii =arg ma.x'\u subject to !I E ['j. Knowing that U; is cOl1vex the 
supporting hyperplane theorem implies that if u EaU; then u is supported by 
15 
a A > O. Then. every 1I E oe; has an associated value Ir; (A) =max All in Co 
and the claim follows since C is closed and convex.D 
The first two steps imply t.hat t.here is an , > 0 such that. for economies with 
wEn-. Wr =limlf,(L )-0 Woo =limlf,IL )-0 \Ft - c Therefore, for every ( > 0 
there exists a positive number b > 0 such that if 11'( L) < b then la\ - W:-:; - .:1 < 
(, Then for a small enough (, 11'( L) < b implies W:x, < Wt. Since Wi is 
continuous on 'P. the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists a 
number !!.Z satisfying 0 < !!.2". < !!.i'l for which Ire.-.: < Wz < Wt. So we know 
that Wr < WIX < W2 < W. and from step 3 it follows that ['r C Ux. C h C Cl. 
o 
The previous theorem establishes t he efficiency costs of a variable and high 
expected inflation in terms of the size of the utility sets. Theorem 3 sharpells 
this result by ranking monet ary policies according to Par,>to's welfare crit Nioll. 
It assert.s that in economies with only nominal as"ets. for a sufficiently higll 
probabilit y of high inflation. ext remely variable monet ary policies make everyone 
worse off. The difference between the two theorems lies in the fact that in 
economies with real and nominal assFts changes in monetary policy lead to 
changes in the prices of reClI ClSSt>ts Jo. redistributing wealth between thos,> thClt 
buy and sell these assets. In tilt> case wlwre reClI asSf'ts are not availahle and 
the conditions of the theorem are mel. wltf'n -:r(II) - I and!!. - x nominal 
assets hecome useless. tlwir value is z'>ro and ewry agent's utility fon\"('rges to 
the autarky point. 
Theorem 3 SUppOH that '2 :::: 11. if j IS fintl( and assumptlOlls 1.} and.) hold. 
Then. for any.,.; En- (a genfrlc Sft of (ndol/·/11cnls). therc U'lstS pOMllu 
numbers band U2 such thal/fO < iT(L) < ~ and!!.1 <!!.2 <!!..x =x: 
u 
h (.,.;h) < u~ < 1I~ < I/~ for all h . 
.\"ole: 1I~ denotes tht> utility of individuClI " Clt an equilibriu1l1 allocCltioll in 
t h,> economy E,. 
Pr'oof: [sketch] TIll' structure of the proof i;; tlw same as the one of tl1l'orelll 
1.	 For economies wit h endowments belonging to t he generic set n". equilib­
rium allocations in the economies El and E"" (with ;r(L) > 0) have the 
hfollowing property: uh (;.,,;h) < u7 and lI ("".h) < 1I~ for all h. As in step 
1 in Theorem 2. this is a consequence of the fact t.hat in a t~'pical economy 
agents trade nominal asset 1. 
JOThis does not oc(,w' if agents ha"e C)uadrat io:- "on:--;ewnann-:'Ilorgenstern utilities. This 
type of preferp.nces are ruled out by assumption S. 
5 
Equilibrium utility functions are 
Lemma 1 and th€'orem 1 imply that 
s 
lim Iim u? = (oh (••} (0)) + lim L 1T;(S)I,h (wh(s)) 0 
..(L)-O..L_o "IH)-I 
~I ~=L+ 1 
3.	 1. and 20 imply that there is a f, such that if 0 < 1T( L) < f, then 1I~ < 1I7. 
4.	 The continuity of u7 on P and the interm€'diate value theorem imply that 
there exists a number!!.2 satisfying Q'.l < !!..2 < x for which II~ < liS < II~ 
for all h. If 1T(L) > O. lI h ( ...oh) < 1I~ from step 1.0 
Examples 
This section contains four examples that illustrate the lemmas and lh"orems 
est ablished in the pr€'\'ious t\\'o St'ct ions. The first t\\'o examples considl:'r an 
economy wit h a real and a nominal bond t hat pay onl' in t'very st at e. In exam pIt' 
1 an increase in the variability of inflation leads to a less t'fficient allocation of 
risk but does not induce a Pareto ranking of equilibria. Exal1lpll:' 2 port rays 
an economy where an increase in the variability of the futurl:' rate of inflation 
induces a Pareto inferior equilibrium. The last two examples deal with an 
economy with only nominal assets. Example 3 illustrates theorem 3. The last 
example underscores thl:' role that tilt' probability distribution 1T has in the 
theorems. It depicts an economy where an increasl:' in tilE' variability of inflat ion 
induces a Parl:'to impro\'eml:'nt because ;r( H) is not large enough for the tllt'oreln 
to apply. 
In all the exampll:'s the lluml)t'r of st at es is S = 3 anu individuals are h =O. 1. 
The utility function if of the C.E.S. type with a risk a\'t'rsion parameter of 2. 
Endowments are..; in examples 1. 3 and 4 and ../ in example 2. where 
:~ .~]
.'­
""	 ­
.:> .~)[ 
.6 .4 
li 
The vector of prices and the financial structure of the economy are 
1'1;1) 111]A(p) = 1'(2)p = [ l.oL a ] [ 
_1­1.008 . (1 1'13) 
The vector of price levels in states s = 0.1,~. 3 is p. The numbers (1 and ?i 
defined in section 2 are ~ = 1.004 . (1 and ?i = 1.008 . (1. Bellow, we look at the 
equilibria corresponding to (1 = 1 and (1 = 30. The financial structure of the 
economy is depicted by the matrix A(p). In the last two examples the only asset 
in the economy is the nominal bond. so the second column of A(p) disappears. 
The following table summarizes the welfare effects of increasing (1 from 1 to 
30 in the four cases considered bellow. 
Table I 
Example Real Bond 71' Endowments Welfare Effect 
1 yes (.20 . .40 .. 40) ".: 1'0 Pareto Ranking. 
2 yes (.20 . .40 ..40) ,/ Pareto Decline. 
"" 
",,'3 no (.02 . .49 . .49) Pareto Decline. 
",,'4 no (.20 . .40, .40) Pareto Improvement. 
5.1 Real and Nominal Assets 
Example 1 So Partlo Ra7lk/llg 
This example illustrates theorem 2., In the example. a shift in monetary 
policy from (1 = 1 to (1 =30 causes the utilities possibilities set to shrink and 
reduces the efficiency with which financial markets allocate risk. The change 
in monetary policy also redistributes income in such a wa~' that the equilibria 
under the two policies are not Pareto comparable. The equilibria are described 
in the following table ll and they are represented by the points a. band c in 
figure 2. 
Table" 
,1'0 l gn gr y~ y~ llO u 
(1=1 
.995 100.9 -100.4 (.54 ..54..54 ..54) 6.296 5.652 
..:
 
(1 =30
 
.244 1.52 .6·j2 -.163 (.59 ..59..36 .. i6) 6.32 4.8 
.....
 
(1 =1
 
.995 100.9 -100.4 (.55 ..55..55 ..55) 6.348 5.58 
....; 
111 Equilibrium conditions imply that yl =_yQ and r =1 - J'o. 
1~ 
The switch from (1 = 1 to (1 =30 makes agent h =0 better-off and agent 
h = 1 worse-off. The redistribution occurs because the monetary policy shift 
induces a decrease in the price of the nominal bond an': an iucrease in the price 
of the real bond. Agent h = 0 that. in equilibrium, purchases nominal bonds 
and sells real ones gains, while agent h =1 loses l2 . 
The inefficiency created by the variabilit~· of the rate of inflation can be 
illustrated by computing the equilibrium that arises if we redistribute date 0 
income in the economy with (1 = 1 and then let people trade. If the transfers 
are dlJ,)o (0) = -dlJ,)l (0) = 0.015 then ~o = (.515 .. 1. .5, .9) and ':;1 = 1 _ ':;0. 
The new equilibrium is described in the last row of the table. Observe that the 
equilibrium with monetary policy (1 = 1 and endowments wPareto dominates 
the equilibrium with monetary policy (1 =30 and the original endowments. 
Another way of illustrating the inefficiency introduced by the variability of 
future price levels is by measuring the gains and losses of each individual in 
terms of date 0 consumption. This can be done by calculating the change in 
consumption in the economy with (1 = 1 that will induce the change in utility 
generated by the shift in monet ary policy. This gain or loss is capt ured by ., h 
in the following expression 
In t he example 
and. hence. ,0 = 0.013 and ..,1 = -.2816. ~Ir. h =0 gains the equivalent of 
1.3% of the aggregate endowment at date 0 and ~Is. h =1 loses the equivalent 
of 287t. The increase in monetary instability is inefficient in the sense that ~Is 
h = 1 loss exceeds Mr. h = 0 gain. If ~Is. h = I gives Mr. h = 0 0.013 
units of date 0 output when (1 = 1 she would be better-off than when monetary 
variability increases to ., =30. whilf? ~Ir. h =0 would be indifferent. 
Example 2 Porelo dfcll1lf. 
In this example an incrt:>ase in monetary instability makes both agents worse­
off. Endowments are j and the change in asset prices is smaller than in the 
previous casel3 . 
12 An important element of this example is that agent 0 has strong incentives to shift income 
towards state 1, while agenl 1 wants to shift income to state 3. The marginal utility at Ihe 
endowment point (before multiplying by 1r(8)) in each ofthe stales is v'(O.l) =100. v/(O.S) =4 
and v'(0.9) ~ 1.23. Hence. agent j's strong demand for the real ass<,ts thal allows her to shift 
income to state 3, 
DEndowments w' are such that agent l's need 10 transfer income into state 3 is much less 
severe and his demand for the real bond is weaker, 
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Table I\' 
Dq" qr y~ y~ ,r D u "I 
(1 = 1 .995 1 25.2 -2.5.2 (.51. .51. .51. .51) 6.0i8 5.918 
(1 = 30 .22i 1.02 .155 -.045 (.51. .51. .46..56) 6.06i 5.89i 
5.2 Only Nominal Assets
 
Example 3 High Probability of High InflatIOn: Parelo Decline.
 
This example illustrates very nicely lemma 1 and theorems 1 and 3. As (1 
increases from 1 to 30, the payoffs of nominal portfolios in the high inflation 
states become infinitesimal and the value of the volume of trade shrinks from 
0.14 units of the consumption good to 0.004 units. The increase in monetary 
instability makes both agents worse-off. 
Table 1\' 
iT qn y~ I'D UO u 1 
(1=1 (.02 . .49 . .49) 3.4i3 -.04 (.64 ..06..46 ..86) 6.46i 2.i94 
(1 = 30 (.02. .49 .. 49) .43i .009 (.496, .109 ..5.. 1) 6.2ii 2.098 
When (1 = 1 agent 0 borrows (in nominal terms) from agent 1 shifting 
income from date 0 to date 1. \\'hen (1 increases to 30 no income can be shifted 
to states 2 and 3. which concent rat e 98<7t of the probabil it y. The gains from 
trade become so small t hat bot h agents' ut ilit y shrinks to t he one corresponding 
to t heir aut arky poin t. 
Example 4 Lou' Probabiltty of High InflatIOn: Panlo IlIlpro l'e m011. 
It is of interest to point out that if we change the vector of probabilities to 
iT = [.2,.4,.4] the welfare effect of an increase in (1 is reversed. That is. when 
moderat e inflat ion is more likely an ext remely variable price le\'el can make 
everyone better-off and theorem 3 does not apply. 
Table \' 
iT qn y~ .l~D uD u l 
(1=1 (.2 ..4,.4) i .51.5 
-.06 (.548 ..094 . .494 ..894) 4.i81 3.015 
(1 =30 (.2,.4,.4) .633 .135 (.414, .235..504, .904) 5.502 3.036 
With (1 = 1 the nominal bond is practically identical to a real bond that 
pays one unit of the consumption good in every state. In equilibrium agent 0 
borrows .048 units of the consumption good from agent 1 at date 0 and repays 
her only .006 units: t he real interest rate is approximately -8i%!l4 The reason 
14The real inleresl rale wilh complele markelS would be zero. 
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why the terms of the loan are so disadvantageous to agent 1 is that her valuation 
of consumption in state 3 is very high and it is very costly for agent 0 to give up 
consumption in state 1. When (J =30 the nominal bond pays. approximately. 
one unit of the consumption good in state 1 and zero in states 2 and 3. In 
equilibrium now agent 0 is long in the nominal bond transferring income from 
date 0 to state 1. Agent 1 borrows in nominal terms and pays an ex-post real 
interest rate of, approximately. 58% in state 1 and -95% in states 2 and 3. In this 
equilibrium. both agents enjoy a higher level of utility than in the equilibrium 
with (J = 1. Most of these gains come from the income that agent 1 hands over 
to agent 0 in the low inflation state. 
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Appendix: 
Proposition 1 If 2 :::: H and assumptions 1,2 and:) hold, then thert el'ists a 
generic set of endowments, n", such that If..; E n",' y~ ¥ 0 for el'ery hand y 
solves (1), 
Lh yh =0 
L. ~h &~~t.) (wh (s) + G (s) yh) OJ (s) = qj for el>ery h,j. 
Proof We show that if we parameterize the economy by the agent's endow­
ments wEn = lR(S+ 1)(H+ 1), the set of endowment.s for which the equat.ions are 
satisfied with y~ = 0 for some h is exceptional. 
Monotonicity of preferences implies that for q to be a solution to (1) it must. 
belong to the set Q = {q : q =o.4(p) for some a E ~~+}. Let n'l be a sequence 
of relatively compact open sets in ?)?(H+I)(S+ll, with nil c nn+l' let yj :Q x 
nn x P x SR~ + I ~ SR be the solution to L. ~ h&~~~.) (""h (s) + 0 (s) yh) Gj (s) = qJ 
corresponding to consumer h and security j and let y : Q x nn x P x SR~ + I _ i)?J 
be y = Lhyh. Define h: Q x n'l x Px~~+1 ~ ~J+I as (y.yn. We analyze 
the behavior of the family of funct ions h t.hat are parameterized by fixed p and 
~-i.e. h(-,p.~): Q x nn - i)?J+I. h is a smooth function 011 Q x nn. \re 
use the transversality theorem to show that 0 is a regular value of h for almost 
every wE nn and then apply the pre-image theorem to prove the proposition. 
Firs! we must show that 0 is a regular value of the restricted h. h (., p. -\). 
That. is ... it her h-I(O) =Cl or Dq.::h : Tq.::(Q x nn) - )~J+I is surjective for all 
(q.:J) E h-I(O). \re prove that for all (q.:J) E h-I(O) and for any dh E )~J+I 
there exists a vect.or (dq. d",,) E Q x nn such that 
dh =Dq::h ( ;~ ) 
Let e l = (1. .... 0) ..... ,J+I = (0 1) be the standard basis in SRJ+I. It 
suffices to show t hat for !'/lch (J: j = I J + 1 there exists a (dq. ri....:) E Q x nil 
such that 
fJ = n _ ( riq )
. uq~ d....; 
Each of the first J vectors eJ can be ohtaillf'd by setting dq = d"",·l - ... _ 
dw H =0 and dw o =(0, -aj(I), .... -OJ(S)). This perturbation of endowments 
allocates to agent 0 an additional unit of security j. while leaving q and the 
portfolio allocat.ions for h = 1.... , H ullchanged. y~ remains unchanged for 
h ¥ O. In order to obtain eJ + I we set dq = dw l =,.. =d..;h-I = dwh+1 = 
= dd· h ° n,[l) !!..!..l.!l) Th' .... =dwH 0an w = - dw = (0 .-PTiT" .. ,- piS)' IS perturbatlOn 
allocates an additional unit of nominal security 1 to agent h, while agent 0 
ends up with one unit less of the same security. leaving the first J equations 
unchanged. 
'2'2 
Given that Q and n" are open. h is smooth in Q x nil and 0 is a regular 
value of h(-,p,:'I) ; Q x nn - ~J+l. the transversality theorem implies that 
there exist.s a set of full measure n~ in nn such t.hat 0 is a regular value of 
h(·,w,p, A) for all w E n~. 
In order t.o prove that the set n° is open we must show that the set h- 1(0) 
is included in a compact set. Observe that. h-I(O) C y-l(O). so it suffices 
to show that there exist compact sets 1\..... A'q such that y-I(O) C 1\..., x A'q. 
The existence of 1\~ is assured since we can let 1\.." be the closure of n". We 
now show that A'q = {q I y(q,w) = O} is (i) bounded and (ii) closed. (i) 1\'q 
is bounded because w.l.o.g. we can restrict q to belong to the normalized set 
QnSJ • whereSJ ={q l2:jqj =I}. (ii)I\'q is closed, for all sequences qt' E I\'q. 
q" -. q::} q E l\q. We show that there is no sequence q" converging to the 
boundary ofQ (q~ aQ). Notice that q' E y-l(O) implies that y(q",;.:) is well 
defined, If q' - q then by continuity y(q.w) should be well defined as well. But 
if q E aQ, y(q,w) is not well defined. Therefore, there is no sequence qt -. q 
with q" E y-l (0) and q E aQ. l\'q can be the closur~ of Q. 
\\'e conclude that for each n there exists an open set of full measure n~ in 
n" such that 0 is a regular value of h(· . ..... p) for all w E n~. It follows from the 
pre-image theorem that the set h;~(O) = {q I h(q. w' p) =O} is empty for all 
wEn;,. Now, observe that since n =C;,-; Jn" and thf' countable union of sets 
of measure zero in ~IH+lIIS+I) has measure zero. n° =l";;ln;, is an open and 
dense set of full measure in n, Repeating the argument for every h we obtain 
the result, 0 
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Figure 1: Representation of Uncertainty
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Figure 2: Efficiency and the Variability 
of the Rate of Inflation. 
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